Federal law makes it a crime to send a threat to injure or kidnap someone by phone, text, email, social media or mail, and to threaten federal officials, federal judges, federal law enforcement officers, the President and others. The most common charges are 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (threats sent in interstate commerce, up to 5 years), § 876 (mailed threats, up to 5 or 10 years), § 115 (threats against federal officials and officers, up to 10 years) and § 871 (threats against the President, up to 5 years). Because these cases involve speech, the Supreme Court has set limits: the statement must be a "true threat," and the government must prove something about the speaker's state of mind. This page explains each law, those limits, the penalties, and how sentencing works under §2A6.1. Criminal Center handles federal threat cases nationwide.
What does the law make illegal?
What counts as a "true threat"
The First Amendment protects a great deal of angry, crude and offensive speech. It doesn't protect "true threats": serious statements expressing that the speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence against a particular person or group (Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)). Political hyperbole is not a true threat. In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under § 871 for a crude remark at a political rally about the President, because in context it was political hyperbole, not a threat. Context, the audience's reaction, and whether the statement was conditional all matter.
The speaker's state of mind: Elonis and Counterman
- Elonis v. United States (2015). A conviction under § 875(c) can't rest only on how a reasonable person would read the words, which is a negligence standard. The mental-state requirement is met if the person sent the message for the purpose of threatening or knowing it would be viewed as a threat. The Court didn't decide whether recklessness is enough (Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015)).
- Counterman v. Colorado (2023). In a true-threats prosecution, the First Amendment requires proof that the speaker had some subjective understanding of the statement's threatening nature, but no more than recklessness: that the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the words would be viewed as threatening violence (Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023)).
Together, these rulings mean a person can't be convicted just because others found the words frightening. The government must prove what the speaker understood. How these rulings apply to each federal threat law, and whether recklessness is enough under a particular statute, can depend on the statute's own words and on the circuit.
Interstate threats, 18 U.S.C. § 875
Section 875(c) makes it a crime to transmit in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing a threat to kidnap any person or to injure the person of another (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). "Interstate commerce" usually includes phone calls, texts, emails and social media posts that cross state lines or travel over the internet. The government must prove the communication was sent, that it contained a true threat, and the required mental state. Other parts of § 875 cover ransom demands (§ 875(a)), threats to injure or kidnap made to extort money or anything of value (§ 875(b)), and threats to damage property or reputation, or to accuse someone of a crime, made to extort (§ 875(d)).
Mailed threats, 18 U.S.C. § 876
Section 876 covers the same kinds of threats sent through the U.S. Postal Service and addressed to another person (18 U.S.C. § 876). A mailed threat to kidnap or injure carries up to 5 years, or up to 10 years if the letter is addressed to a U.S. judge, a federal law enforcement officer, or an official covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (§ 876(c)). Letters sent from prison are a common source of these cases.
Threats against federal officials, judges and officers, 18 U.S.C. § 115
It is a crime to threaten to assault, kidnap or murder a U.S. official, a U.S. judge, a federal law enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would be a federal crime under § 1114, or a member of the immediate family of any of them (18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)). The government must also prove an intent to impede, intimidate or interfere with the official in doing their duties, or to retaliate for those duties. Threats against former officials or their families, made to retaliate for their past service, are also covered (§ 115(a)(2)).
- "U.S. official" means the President, Vice President, the President-elect and Vice President-elect, members and members-elect of Congress, heads of executive departments, and the CIA Director (§ 115(c)(4)).
- "U.S. judge" includes Supreme Court justices and magistrate judges; "federal law enforcement officer" includes any federal officer, agent or employee authorized to prevent, detect, investigate or prosecute federal crimes (§ 115(c)).
Threats against the President and Vice President, 18 U.S.C. § 871
It is a crime to knowingly and willfully make a threat to kill, kidnap or inflict bodily harm on the President, President-elect, Vice President, Vice President-elect, or the officer next in the order of succession, whether by mail or otherwise (18 U.S.C. § 871). The Secret Service investigates these cases.
Threats against former Presidents, family members and candidates, 18 U.S.C. § 879
It is a crime to knowingly and willfully threaten to kill, kidnap or inflict bodily harm on a former President, certain family members of current and former Presidents and Vice Presidents, a major presidential or vice-presidential candidate, or another person the Secret Service protects under 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(6) (18 U.S.C. § 879).
Bomb and fire threats and hoaxes, 18 U.S.C. § 844(e)
It is a crime to use the mail, a phone or another means of interstate commerce to willfully make a threat, or knowingly pass along false information, about an attempt to kill, injure or intimidate anyone, or to damage property, by fire or explosives (18 U.S.C. § 844(e)). The maximum is 10 years.
Stalking and harassing calls, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A and 47 U.S.C. § 223
A repeated course of conduct using the mail, internet, phone or other facilities of interstate commerce, with intent to kill, injure, harass or intimidate, that places a person in reasonable fear of death or serious injury or causes substantial emotional distress can be charged as stalking (18 U.S.C. § 2261A). The maximum is generally 5 years, with more if a weapon was used or injury resulted (18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)). Some harassing or threatening phone calls and messages are charged under 47 U.S.C. § 223, with a 2-year maximum.
What are the penalties?
| Law | Conduct | Maximum prison |
|---|---|---|
| § 875(c) | Interstate threat to kidnap or injure | 5 years |
| § 875(b) | Threat to kidnap or injure, to extort | 20 years |
| § 875(d) | Threat to property or reputation, to extort | 2 years |
| § 876(c) | Mailed threat to kidnap or injure | 5 years; 10 if addressed to a U.S. judge, federal law enforcement officer or § 1114 official |
| § 115(b)(4) | Threat against a federal official, judge, officer or family member | 10 years; 6 years for a threatened assault |
| § 871 | Threat against the President, Vice President or successor | 5 years |
| § 879 | Threat against former Presidents, family members, candidates | 5 years |
| § 844(e) | Bomb or fire threat or hoax | 10 years |
| § 2261A | Stalking | 5 years, more with a weapon or injury |
- Fines: up to $250,000 per felony count (18 U.S.C. § 3571).
- Supervised release: up to 3 years for most threat felonies (18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)). Conditions often include no contact with the person threatened, limits on internet or social media use, and mental health treatment.
- Restitution: where the threat caused costs, such as an evacuation or emergency response, the court may order restitution (18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3663A).
- Time limit: generally 5 years from the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3282).
How does sentencing work for this charge?
Most threat cases are sentenced under USSG §2A6.1. The base offense level is 12. Then:
- +6 if the offense involved any conduct showing an intent to carry out the threat, such as buying a weapon, traveling toward the person, or gathering information about them (§2A6.1(b)(1)).
- +2 if the offense involved more than two threats (§2A6.1(b)(2)).
- +2 if it violated a court protection order (§2A6.1(b)(3)).
- +4 if it caused substantial disruption of public, government or business functions, or a substantial expense to respond, such as an evacuation (§2A6.1(b)(4)).
- +2 for a public threat under § 115 that the person knew or should have known created a substantial risk of inciting others to violate § 115 (§2A6.1(b)(5)).
- −4 if none of those increases apply and the offense was a single instance showing little or no deliberation, such as one angry message sent in the moment (§2A6.1(b)(6)).
If the threat was motivated by the victim's status as a government officer or employee, the official victim adjustment usually adds 6 levels, because §2A6.1 is in Chapter Two, Part A (USSG §3A1.2(a), (b)). Stalking cases are sentenced under §2A6.2, which starts at level 18. The 2-level zero-point reduction is not available to someone who used credible threats of violence in connection with the offense (USSG §4C1.1(a)(3)).
Scheduled change, November 1, 2026. Amendments the Sentencing Commission sent Congress on April 30, 2026 are scheduled to take effect November 1, 2026, unless Congress acts. They make no change to the offense levels in §2A6.1. They replace the multiple-count rules in Chapter Three, Part D, with a single guideline, §3D1.1. The §2A6.1 commentary is rewritten so that counts for threats against the same victim, even on separate occasions, are still treated together rather than added one on top of another, because the guideline already accounts for repeated threats. Counts involving different victims are still counted separately. (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2026 amendments)
Pending at the Supreme Court. In Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343, set for argument on October 13, 2026, the Court agreed to decide whether Stinson v. United States (1993) still states the rule for how much weight courts must give the Guidelines’ commentary, the notes that follow each guideline. The answer could affect rules on this page that come from commentary rather than from the guideline text itself.
Guideline numbers on this page are from the Guidelines Manual in effect since November 1, 2025, which no longer uses “departures”: the judge calculates the range, then weighs the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For more depth, see How the federal Sentencing Guidelines work, at Sentencing.net, a Criminal Center site.
How do these cases usually start and move?
Threat cases often move fast. Someone reports a message or post, and the FBI, the Secret Service (for the President and other protectees), the U.S. Marshals Service (for federal judges), the U.S. Capitol Police (for members of Congress) or the Postal Inspection Service investigates. Agents frequently ask online platforms and phone companies for account records and may get search warrants for phones and accounts. Many people first learn of a case when agents knock on the door and ask about a post, which is a good time to talk with a lawyer before answering.
After an arrest, the government often asks the court to hold the person until trial as a danger to the community (18 U.S.C. § 3142). Release, if granted, usually comes with no-contact and internet conditions. Mental health often plays a role, and the court may order an evaluation of whether the person is competent to stand trial (18 U.S.C. § 4241).
The usual stages of a federal case
- Investigation. Agents gather records and interview witnesses, often using grand jury subpoenas. Someone the prosecutor views as a "target" may get a target letter before an indictment (Justice Manual 9-11.151, 9-11.153).
- Charges. A federal felony is usually charged by indictment: a grand jury decides in private whether there is probable cause (Fed. R. Crim. P. 6, 7). Some cases start with an arrest on a criminal complaint.
- First appearance and detention. After an arrest, the person goes before a magistrate judge without unnecessary delay (Fed. R. Crim. P. 5). The judge decides whether they are released or held until trial (18 U.S.C. § 3142).
- Evidence and motions. The government must turn over certain evidence (Fed. R. Crim. P. 16). The defense can ask the court to suppress evidence or dismiss charges (Fed. R. Crim. P. 12).
- Plea or trial. Many federal cases end in a guilty plea, which the judge must find knowing and voluntary (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11). At trial, the government must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury verdict must be unanimous (Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a)).
- Sentencing. A probation officer writes a presentence report, and each side can object in writing within 14 days of receiving it (Fed. R. Crim. P. 32). The judge then decides the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
More on what to do at each stage: Facing federal charges? What to do now.
What defense issues come up in these cases?
- Was it a true threat? Read in full context, was it a serious expression of intent to commit violence, or hyperbole, a joke, venting, art or political speech, as in Watts?
- Mental state. What can the government prove about what the person understood? After Elonis and Counterman, how others reacted is not enough on its own.
- Conditional or vague words. Who was the target, and was the statement tied to a condition or event?
- Covered person and purpose. Under § 115, is the target a covered official, judge or officer, and is there evidence of intent to impede, intimidate or retaliate? Under § 876(c), was the letter actually addressed to a covered person?
- Interstate commerce and venue. Did the message travel in interstate commerce, and was the case brought in a proper district?
- Identity. Who actually wrote or sent the message from the account or phone?
- Guideline increases. Is there real evidence of conduct showing an intent to carry out the threat (+6)? Does the −4 reduction for a single impulsive message apply?
Every case turns on its own facts. These are issues to look at, not predictions about how any case will turn out.
What happens after a conviction?
- Appeal. A notice of appeal is usually due within 14 days after the judgment is entered (Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)). Many plea agreements waive the right to appeal, but in Hunter v. United States (2026) the Supreme Court held that a waiver can’t be enforced when doing so would cause a miscarriage of justice, a high bar. See federal appeals at Sentencing.net.
- A § 2255 motion. A motion asking the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence, for example for ineffective assistance of counsel. It is usually due within one year after the conviction becomes final (28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)). See 2255motion.com.
- Compassionate release. A motion asking the judge to reduce a prison sentence for extraordinary and compelling reasons, filed after the person asks the warden and either exhausts BOP appeals or waits 30 days (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). It can’t be used to attack the validity of the conviction itself (Fernandez v. United States (2026)). See CompassionateRelease.com.
- Clemency. The President can pardon a federal offense or commute (shorten) a federal sentence (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2). See Clemency.com.
Common questions
Can a social media post be a federal crime?
Yes, if it is a true threat to kidnap or injure someone and it travels in interstate commerce, which online posts usually do (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). The government must prove more than that a reasonable person would see it as threatening. Under Elonis v. United States (2015), sending it for the purpose of threatening, or knowing it would be seen as a threat, is enough, and under Counterman v. Colorado (2023) the First Amendment requires at least recklessness about how it would be understood.
What did Counterman v. Colorado decide?
In 2023 the Supreme Court held that in a true-threats prosecution, the First Amendment requires proof that the speaker had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of the statements, and that recklessness is enough. Recklessness means the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the words would be viewed as threatening violence.
What is the penalty for threatening a federal judge or federal agent?
Under 18 U.S.C. § 115, threatening to assault, kidnap or murder a federal judge or federal law enforcement officer, with intent to impede or retaliate against them, carries up to 10 years, or up to 6 years for a threatened assault. A mailed threat addressed to a federal judge or officer carries up to 10 years under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).
Is a joke or political exaggeration a crime?
Not if it is not a true threat. In Watts v. United States (1969), the Supreme Court held that a crude statement about the President at a political rally was political hyperbole, not a threat. Whether a statement is a true threat depends on its full context, and the government must also prove the speaker's state of mind.
Related federal charges
Sources
- 18 U.S.C. § 875 (interstate communications)
- 18 U.S.C. § 876 (mailing threatening communications)
- 18 U.S.C. § 115 (threats against federal officials, judges and officers)
- 18 U.S.C. § 871 (threats against the President and successors)
- 18 U.S.C. § 879 (threats against former Presidents and others)
- 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (bomb and fire threats)
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A, 2261(b) (stalking)
- 47 U.S.C. § 223 (harassing telephone and electronic communications)
- 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (officers and employees protected)
- 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (competency to stand trial)
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282, 3571, 3583
- USSG §2A6.1 (2025 manual)
- USSG §2A6.2 (stalking)
- USSG §3A1.2 (official victim)
- USSG §4C1.1 (zero-point offenders)
- 2026 amendments: Multiple Counts
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) (U.S. Reports, govinfo.gov)
- Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023)
- 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (imposition of a sentence; safety valve)
- 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (release or detention before trial)
- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5, 6, 7, 11, 16, 32
- Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255
- 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate release)
- U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2 (pardon power)
- Justice Manual 9-11.151 and 9-11.153 (targets of grand jury investigations)
- U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1, 2025)
- U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments effective Nov. 1, 2026 (submitted to Congress Apr. 30, 2026)
- Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343 (docket)
- Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026)
- Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. 411 (2026)
Law checked against these sources on . This page is general information about federal law, not legal advice for any case.
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