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Rule 404(b), other traffic stops and a new-counsel request

Updated By Brandon SampleCourt decisions

On November 10, 2026, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury's guilty verdicts against Michael Patton. He had been convicted of three federal drug and firearm counts. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused a request for a new appointed lawyer at the start of trial, or when he let the jury hear about three other traffic stops, one of them as other-act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Judge Traynor wrote the opinion in United States v. Patton, No. 25-3498. Read the decision (PDF).

Key points

  • Can a judge refuse a new appointed lawyer on the first day of trial? Yes, if the judge looks into the complaints and the person does not show justifiable dissatisfaction, such as an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication. The court found no abuse of discretion here. Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard: the appeals court asks whether the ruling was within the range of choices open to the trial judge, not whether it would have ruled the same way.
  • Can a jury hear about traffic stops other than the one charged? Sometimes. The court treated two earlier stops as intrinsic, meaning part of the story of the charged crime, and upheld a later stop as other-act evidence under Rule 404(b) on knowledge and intent.
  • Does it matter that the other stop came after the charged conduct? Not on these facts. The August 2021 stop came about three months later and was still admitted, with a limiting instruction. A limiting instruction tells the jury the only purpose for which it may consider a piece of evidence.

What happened

In May 2021, an officer stopped Patton for driving without a front license plate. The opinion says Patton's furtive movements, and the officer's earlier experience with him, led the officer to detain Patton and search the vehicle. The search found firearms and methamphetamine. Patton was arrested.

The opinion describes the indictment in three counts: possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Federal law describes those same three offenses in 21 U.S.C. § 841, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The opinion does not quote the statutory text.

The case was tried in the Western District of Missouri at Springfield. The opinion identifies the trial judge as Brian C. Wimes, then a United States District Judge for that district and now Chief Judge. The appeal was submitted on September 24, 2026. Chief Judge Colloton and Judges L.R. Smith and Traynor heard it.

Before trial, the government filed a notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The notice covered three other traffic stops, in August 2020, January 2021, and August 2021. Patton asked the judge to keep that evidence out. The judge refused. He treated the August 2020 and January 2021 stops as intrinsic to the charged crimes. He treated the August 2021 stop as other-act evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) for a purpose other than character.

At the start of trial, Patton asked for a new lawyer. During trial, the government introduced evidence about the three stops. The opinion says Patton renewed his objection each time, the judge overruled it, and law enforcement officers testified about each stop. The jury convicted him on all three counts. On appeal he asked for the judgment to be vacated and for a new trial. The questions were the new-lawyer ruling and the three other stops. The opinion leaves the lawfulness of the May 2021 vehicle search undecided.

Can a judge refuse a new appointed lawyer on the first day of trial?

Yes, if the judge looks into the complaints and the person does not show justifiable dissatisfaction. The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the refusal here.

The Sixth Amendment gives a person charged with a crime the right to the assistance of counsel. The Patton opinion quotes United States v. Baisden, 713 F.3d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 2013): a defendant has no right to an attorney who will "docilely do as [he] is told" or to a "meaningful relationship" with appointed counsel. Baisden quotes United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992), for that sentence.

The opinion says a defendant who wants a new appointed lawyer must show justifiable dissatisfaction. That can come from an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication. The opinion cites United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 934, 942 (8th Cir. 2016), and describes the standard as strict. Frustration with the lawyer, or with a tactical choice, is not enough. It cites Hunter v. Delo, 62 F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1995), for that limit.

What Patton told the judge, and what the court held

Patton told the judge he was "not happy" with his appointed lawyer. The lawyer had declined to file a suppression motion, which asks the court to keep evidence out of the trial, and Patton said the lawyer met with him "at the last minute." The opinion says the judge asked about each complaint, considered them, and gave reasons. It says the judge explained that counsel's refusal to file a frivolous motion did not warrant a new lawyer, and that a change of counsel would cause undue delay.

The opinion describes the judge's job, citing United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002). When prompted, the judge must adequately inquire into the nature and extent of the claimed breakdown. Quoting Barrow, the opinion says the judge must balance "the need to ensure effective legal representation, the need to thwart abusive delay tactics, and the reality that a person accused of crime is often genuinely unhappy with an appointed counsel who is nonetheless doing a good job." When the facts are already established, the judge may rule without an intensive inquiry. The opinion cites United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir. 2010), for that point, and United States v. Klein, 13 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 1994), for the point that a last-minute request to substitute counsel is disfavored.

The court reviews the ruling for abuse of discretion. It cites United States v. Harriman, 970 F.3d 1048, 1059 (8th Cir. 2020). The court said it was satisfied that the judge gave Patton a sufficient opportunity to express his concerns and adequately inquired into the attorney-client relationship. It found no abuse of discretion. (Patton.)

Can a jury hear about traffic stops other than the one charged?

Sometimes. In Patton, the court treated two earlier stops as intrinsic to the charged crimes and upheld a later stop as other-act evidence under Rule 404(b).

The court reviews a decision to admit evidence for a clear abuse of discretion, and it reverses only if the ruling affected substantial rights. The opinion cites United States v. Watson, 895 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2018).

Rule 404(b) is the rule on other crimes, wrongs, or acts. It bars using that evidence to prove a person's character in order to show that the person acted in line with that character on a particular occasion. The same rule allows the evidence for another purpose, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

The opinion says Rule 404(b) applies to extrinsic evidence. Intrinsic evidence falls outside the rule. It cites United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006). Evidence is intrinsic, the opinion says, when it is offered to give the context in which the charged crime occurred, because it completes the story or provides a total picture of that crime. Evidence of another crime that is blended with the one on trial, so that proof of one incidentally involves the other, explains the circumstances, or tends logically to prove an element, can come in as part of the immediate context. The opinion describes United States v. Forcelle, 86 F.3d 838, 841–42 (8th Cir. 1996), that way.

The August 2020 stop

During that stop, Patton admitted he was on parole, and officers then found firearms in the vehicle. He was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held this evidence was intrinsic. It tended to prove an element of the felon-in-possession count in this case: that Patton knew he was a felon. The opinion cites United States v. Fisher, 115 F.4th 875, 877–78 (8th Cir. 2024), for that element.

The January 2021 stop

Officers again found firearms and arrested Patton. The officer who made that stop is the same officer who stopped him in May 2021, the stop that led to these charges. The court held the January stop was intrinsic because it supplied the context for the charged crime and the later arrest. The opinion says the officer's decisions in May 2021 were informed by the January stop, where Patton illegally possessed firearms.

The August 2021 stop

This stop came about three months after the charged conduct. Patton was a passenger. Officers recovered firearms from the vehicle. The district court admitted this stop under Rule 404(b). Patton argued it was irrelevant and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The opinion describes the Eighth Circuit's test, from United States v. Steele, 550 F.3d 693, 700–01 (8th Cir. 2008): the other-act evidence must be relevant to a material issue, similar in kind and close in time to the charged crime, supported by sufficient evidence, and not outweighed in probative value by its prejudicial impact. Where knowing possession is an element, the opinion says, evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm on another occasion is relevant to knowledge and intent. It cites United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 2006).

The court treated Patton's possession of a firearm at the August 2021 stop as relevant to his knowledge and intent at the May 2021 stop. It also relied on a limiting instruction. The opinion says the instruction addressed the risk of unfair prejudice, citing United States v. Harrison, 70 F.4th 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 2023). The opinion does not quote the instruction. The court found no abuse of discretion.

What it means in a federal case

  • What the new-lawyer request had to show. Under the standard the opinion applies, the person has to show justifiable dissatisfaction, such as an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication. Unhappiness with a tactical choice, including a lawyer's decision to skip a motion, fell short of that standard on these facts.
  • Timing matters. The request came at the start of trial. The opinion treats last-minute substitution requests as disfavored, and it notes that delay is one reason a judge may refuse the change after looking into the complaint.
  • Some other stops can come in as part of the charged crime. The court treated the August 2020 parole admission, and the January 2021 stop by the same officer, as intrinsic. Those rulings sit outside Rule 404(b) on this opinion's description of the rule.
  • A later stop can still be other-act evidence. The August 2021 stop was after the charged conduct. The court still admitted it under Rule 404(b) on knowledge and intent, with a limiting instruction. The opinion does not set out the words of that instruction.
  • The May 2021 search stayed off this appeal. The opinion reviews the new-lawyer ruling and the other-stop evidence, and it affirms the judgment. The lawfulness of the May 2021 vehicle search is left undecided. This is a decision of the Eighth Circuit, which hears appeals from federal courts in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.

Our guides to a federal trial, a motion to suppress, federal drug trafficking, federal gun charges, and appeals in the Eighth Circuit explain the trial, a suppression motion, and how a circuit ruling is reviewed.

Source: United States v. Patton, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, No. 25-3498. Read the source

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