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How consent to search and the Speedy Trial Act applied

Updated By Brandon SampleCourt decisions

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Jamill McDonald's federal drug convictions. He had asked police to check his apartment for a burglar. During that check they found a wrapped kilogram of cocaine on a closet shelf, and a later warrant turned up more drugs. The court held that the closet check stayed within his consent, that the package was in plain view, and that the November 18, 2024 trial date did not violate the Speedy Trial Act. The clerk filed the opinion in United States v. McDonald, No. 25-3344, on November 5, 2026. It is marked not recommended for publication. Read the decision (PDF).

Judges Griffin, Bush, and Hermandorfer decided the appeal. The main opinion is per curiam, meaning it is issued for the court and not signed by one judge. Judge Hermandorfer wrote separately on one point. (McDonald.)

Key points

  • Can police look in a closet when asked to check a home for a burglar? On these facts, yes. The district court found that McDonald consented to a protective sweep, which is a quick safety check for people, and that the department's usual two-stage check, closet included, was part of it. The appeals court found no clear error.
  • Can officers seize a wrapped package they see during that check? Yes, if it is in plain view: the officer sees it from a place the officer may lawfully be, its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and the officer may lawfully reach it. The court upheld the finding that this brick-shaped package met that test.
  • Does a paper captioned "waiver" cancel the Speedy Trial Act? No. A defendant cannot opt out of the Act. But an order that makes the ends-of-justice findings the Act requires can still exclude time, whatever its caption says.
  • Is this binding precedent? No. The opinion is marked not recommended for publication.

What happened

In October 2023, McDonald was away from his apartment in Mayfield Heights, Ohio, when a Ring alert showed someone in a hoodie trying to force the front door. He called the police and reported a break-in with a crowbar, a sledgehammer, or something like them. Dispatch logged the call as a burglary.

Sergeant Bill Dvorak, a 27-year veteran, responded with four other officers. The door was damaged but not open. McDonald arrived, showed them the video, and unlocked the door. The opinion says everyone agreed they did not know whether a burglar had gotten inside and then closed the door. McDonald authorized the officers to check the apartment and make sure the suspect was not still inside.

The officers used a two-step safety check. The first pass is fast: they move through each room to see whether someone is an immediate danger, then call the room clear. The second pass looks for hiding places, including behind a shower curtain, on a balcony, or in a closet. Neither pass found a burglar.

The package in the closet

On the second pass, Sergeant Dvorak aimed a flashlight into a bedroom closet. At about eye level he saw a brick-shaped package in dark brown or maroon paper, wrapped in cellophane. He testified that the size and packaging were consistent with a kilogram of cocaine and that his immediate reaction was that it was contraband. Two other officers, including one from the drug unit, confirmed that view.

Officers asked McDonald what the package was. He declined to say. They arrested him, found two phones and $2,764 in cash in his pockets, and moved the package into the hallway. Detective Todd Hanley, who knew from a stop about a year earlier that McDonald had a drug history and was on federal supervised release, came to the scene. He cut a small opening in the package, saw white powder, and used a field test that he said was presumptively positive for cocaine.

Officers then woke a judge around 2:00 a.m., got a warrant for the rest of the apartment, and found fentanyl, heroin, more cocaine, cannabis, three more phones, a scale, and more than $10,000 in cash.

The charges, the motions and the trial

McDonald later posted bond in state court. Federal officers arrested him on a warrant for violating supervised release. Prosecutors then obtained a separate indictment for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and fentanyl. He moved to suppress the apartment evidence, meaning he asked the court to keep it out of the trial, and the district court denied the motion after a hearing. He also moved twice to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. The district court denied both motions.

After a two-day trial that began on November 18, 2024, a jury convicted him of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 40 grams of fentanyl. The district court, applying enhanced mandatory minimums based on his status as a felon, sentenced him to 420 months in prison. The appeal challenged the trial date and the search, not the guideline math.

What is the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day clock?

The Speedy Trial Act requires the government to try a defendant within 70 days of the initial appearance or the charging document, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Missing that deadline can lead to dismissal of the indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The 70 days are not every calendar day. Delay from a pretrial motion is excluded automatically, from the filing through the hearing or other prompt decision. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). The McDonald opinion describes United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 656, 659 (2011), as treating that exclusion as automatic.

A judge may also stop the clock with a continuance, which is an order moving a hearing or trial to a later date. Section 3161(h)(7)(A) requires the judge to state on the record, orally or in writing, why the ends of justice served by the delay outweigh the public's interest, and the defendant's interest, in a speedy trial. One factor is whether refusing the continuance would deny the defendant or counsel the reasonable time needed to prepare, taking due diligence into account. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).

In Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot opt out of the Act. A defense request for a continuance still has to fit one of the exclusions in subsection (h). If the judge does not make the required findings, the delay counts, and harmless-error review does not erase it. The opinion cites Zedner at 500 and 508–09.

The McDonald opinion says the court reads the Act anew, reviews facts for clear error, and reviews the decision to grant this kind of continuance for abuse of discretion.

Did the trial date violate the Speedy Trial Act?

No. The Sixth Circuit found no Speedy Trial Act violation in the November 18, 2024 trial. It treated the August 8 continuance as running at least to September 23 and held that the later continuance for new counsel kept the clock stopped.

McDonald's clock started at his first appearance on May 3, 2024. By August 8, 2024, the district court counted 58 days that counted toward the 70. The government counted 55. The appeals court said the three-day gap did not change the result. McDonald's appeal focused on the time after August 8. By his own count, 85 days passed between his first appearance and the start of trial. The court said it did not need to check that number, because it rejected his premise that the continuances were improper.

The August 8 continuance

At the August 8 hearing, it became clear he might qualify as a career offender, which would raise his sentencing exposure. He asked for time so probation could prepare a pre-plea criminal-history report and he could decide whether to pursue a plea. The judge asked three times whether he was seeking a continuance. Three times he said yes.

The judge found, on the record, that the ends of justice supported the continuance and that refusing it would deny him and his lawyer reasonable time to prepare. A written order the same day, signed by McDonald and the lawyers, repeated those findings and cited § 3161(h)(7). The order was captioned as a waiver, and it set no end date. During the hearing the judge had suggested 30 days. The parties instead agreed on a September 23 trial date and signed the open-ended order.

McDonald argued that the caption made the order a prospective waiver, which Zedner forbids. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The label did not control. The order made the findings subsection (h)(7) requires and cited that subsection. The opinion describes United States v. White, 920 F.3d 1109, 1116 (6th Cir. 2019), as allowing time for plea talks to be excluded when the judge makes those findings. It also describes United States v. Richardson, 681 F.3d 736, 743 (6th Cir. 2012), as permitting a reasonable open-ended continuance. Here the order answered McDonald's own request, and the opinion describes the resulting delay as about two months.

The later delays for new counsel

The court also said later delays would have stopped the clock even if the August 8 order had ended on September 23. It did not hold that the order ended that day. On August 29, McDonald asked for a new lawyer. The judge warned that the change would delay the case and that trial would likely slip into January. McDonald said he wanted another lawyer. The court granted the request. New counsel was appointed in early September. At a September 19 hearing, that lawyer said he had just received discovery, and he agreed to a mid-November trial date so he could prepare.

McDonald later ended that representation and went to trial without a lawyer. The opinion notes that the choice required a hearing under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and standby counsel. The appeal did not ask the court to undo that choice. The judge kept the mid-November date.

McDonald argued that these later continuances did not count because the judge did not repeat an ends-of-justice formula each time. The opinion describes White as rejecting a magic-words rule: a continuance can stand when the reasons are clear from the record. The judge had already found that more time was needed, had warned that new counsel would mean a later trial and more time in pretrial detention, and had set the new date so counsel could learn the case. The court adopted the finding of 58 countable days as of August 8, treated the August 8 continuance as running at least to September 23, and held that the later continuance for new counsel kept the clock stopped. It found no Speedy Trial Act violation in the November 18 trial.

Did the closet check and the package seizure violate the Fourth Amendment?

No, the court held. The closet check stayed within McDonald's consent, the package was in plain view, and the officers could open it.

The Fourth Amendment protects people in their houses against unreasonable searches and seizures. On a motion to suppress, the McDonald opinion says the court reviews facts for clear error and legal questions anew, and it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.

McDonald made four arguments. The closet was outside the consent. The package was not in plain view. Officers needed a warrant before they cut it open and field-tested it. Without that package, the later warrant for the apartment should not have issued.

The scope of consent

Consent comes first. In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), the Supreme Court said the scope of consent is what a typical reasonable person would have understood from the exchange. The opinion treats whether someone consented, and whether the search went past that consent, as facts reviewed for clear error. It also says consent to look for a burglar does not let officers linger and look for unrelated evidence.

The district court credited the officers' testimony, which McDonald did not contradict. It found that he consented to a protective sweep, and that both stages of the department's usual check, including the closet, were part of that sweep. The appeals court found no clear error.

Plain view of the package

Plain view is next. The opinion describes the test from Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990): an officer may seize evidence seen from a lawful vantage point when its incriminating character is immediately apparent and the officer may lawfully reach the object. Sergeant Dvorak was allowed to look in the closet with a flashlight. The district court found, from uncontradicted testimony, that the brick sat at eye level and that he did not have to move other items to see it. The opinion describes prior circuit law as treating a flashlight as still plain view.

McDonald argued that the wrapping did not make the contents obvious, and that officers needed more investigation, or specialized knowledge, before the package counted. The district court credited Sergeant Dvorak's testimony that he recognized the shape, size, and cellophane at once, from training and experience. The appeals court said that finding was not clear error. It describes United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 733 (6th Cir. 2013), as holding that later confirmation by other officers does not undo probable cause that already existed. It also describes Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment), as allowing an officer to use training and experience to draw inferences that might elude someone without that training.

Opening and testing the package

Opening the package was a further search of a container, not a plain-view seizure. The opinion says the plain-view doctrine allows certain warrantless seizures, not a further search of a container. In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984), the Supreme Court said a person has no legitimate privacy interest in contraband, and it held that a chemical test that discloses only whether a substance is cocaine is not a Fourth Amendment search. The per curiam opinion treated this brick as a single-purpose container whose size and wrapping proclaimed a kilogram of drugs. It held that the officers' knowledge approaching certainty that the package held contraband allowed them to open it. The field test of a trace of powder followed that opening; under Jacobsen, that chemical test is not itself a search.

Because that discovery was lawful, the court held that officers could use it in the warrant application for the rest of the apartment. It did not decide how the good-faith exception would have applied if the package had been found unlawfully.

A separate view of the field test

Judge Hermandorfer concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. A concurrence is a separate opinion by a judge who agrees with the result but would reach it, at least in part, for different reasons. On the field test, he would have affirmed for a different reason. He wrote that officers decided to seek a warrant as soon as they saw the brick, and that they did get one. Even with the field-test result removed, he wrote, the affidavit still showed probable cause: the apparent brick, McDonald's response when asked about it, two phones, $2,764 in cash, and federal supervised release for a cocaine conspiracy. A warrant to search the apartment for drugs would have covered the package.

He would have affirmed even if cutting the package open before the warrant was a mistake, citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 541 (1988), for the point that suppression should not leave the police worse off than if no violation had occurred. That path is his concurrence. The per curiam opinion is the one that treated the opening and the field test as lawful.

What it means in a federal case

  • A request to check for an intruder has a scope. In McDonald, a typical reasonable person would have understood the request to include the department's usual two-step sweep, closet included. Consent to look for a person is not, on this opinion's description of the law, permission to stay and search for drugs once that check is done.
  • Plain view can include a wrapped package. The district court's finding that the kilogram was immediately apparent, from size, shape, wrapping, and the officer's training, was not clear error. A flashlight, and a second officer's confirmation, did not take the package out of plain view on these facts.
  • Opening the package was disputed inside the panel. The per curiam opinion held that the officers' knowledge approaching certainty that the package held contraband allowed them to open it. Under Jacobsen, the field test is not itself a search. One judge would have relied instead on the warrant the officers were already going to get. The judgment is an affirmance either way.
  • A paper captioned "waiver" is not automatically a waiver of the Speedy Trial Act. Zedner still bars opting out of the Act. An order that states the subsection (h)(7) findings can exclude time even if the caption uses the word waiver.
  • Later lawyer changes can keep the clock stopped. The court looked at warnings on the record, the reason for each delay, and counsel's agreement to a date past the 70 days. It did not require the same statutory sentence at every hearing.
  • The opinion is not a published Sixth Circuit precedent. Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1(b) says published panel opinions are binding on later panels. This opinion is marked not recommended for publication. Rule 32.1(a) permits citation of it. The appeal arose from the Northern District of Ohio.

Our guides to a motion to suppress, a federal trial, the stages of a federal case, federal drug trafficking, and appeals in the Sixth Circuit explain the hearing, the clock, and how a circuit ruling is reviewed.

Source: United States v. McDonald, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No. 25-3344. Read the source

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